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In their critical paper on images in the health sciences, Roger Cooter and Claudia Stein
pointed out the limits of visualisation and representation in the existing literature in the
public representation of health and illness.
1 They focus on the complex and multilayered
field of medical representations as the site where levels of epistemic, philosophical and
political presuppositions provide insight into the interpreter’s historical position. From a
close focus on medical (or even public health) representations as a reflection of a partial
worldview, to the historical embeddedness that they suggest is the key to understanding
the limitations of all visual hermeneutics in the sphere of health and illness:
[H]istorians seeking to use visual materials need to be aware that any instruction as to their use is
a priori discourse laden. The coming into focus of health posters in the 1990s and visual culture in
general as something of seemingly great importance, something for serious critical engagement, is
but a perception of one particular sociocultural moment (precisely that which we have sought to
outline in this paper). It is a discursive regime, not a universal truth. Historians of medicine should
by all means be encouraged to pursue the abundant visual objects in their field, and treat such
objects in terms appropriate to the context of their production. A multiplicity of approaches is
also to be encouraged. But they should do so with awareness of, and open candour towards the his-
toricity of the discourses around the visual from which their approaches derive; that is, they should
be attentive to how their mindedness to the visual has been informed.
2
But the response to such a warning in a moment now given to the empirical, the material,
the ‘real’ in the study of the history and culture of medicine, is to disqualify the study
of representations as ‘merely’ the interest of a subjective and therefore not transcendental
history. Tom Mitchell had supported the view espoused by Cooter and Stein in the
mid-1990s observing that ‘representation (in memory, in verbal descriptions, in images)
not only “mediates” our knowledge (of slavery and of many other things), but obstructs,
fragments, and negates that knowledge.’
3 For him, representations are not merely
‘objects representing’ but an index (in the sense of C.S. Peirce) of the means by which
representations are produced and received. Today’s new functionalism seems to
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295have moved towards the ‘real’ in ways that question the very premises of theories of
representation.
While the shift in claims of the history and culture of medicine have not been as radi-
cal as that in recent literary interpretation, with its discovery of the claimed objectivity of
brain imaging and the neurosciences or evolutionary biology or psychology as the single
pathway to a true understanding of the process of literary creation or reception, there is a
false empiricism in medical history that has rejected the study of representations in its
totality because of its ‘merely’ subjective nature. The new social history of medicine
seems to have become a means of speaking about the reality that is ‘merely’ mirrored
in representations, while the real questions to be asked by the history and culture of med-
icine are understood to lie within clinical reality, biological empiricism, or even within
the absolute of social reality. Thus, the new study of childhood by the anthropologist
Melvin Konner seeks the absolutes of development psychology (which he reads as a
map for evolutionary psychology) to replace an environmental or historical model of
childhood with a developmental / genetic model.
4 That childhood is also, and has long
been understood as, an historical and cultural phenomenon, does not figure into his cal-
culus. So much for the history of childhood; replaced by brain scans and genetic maps.
Such a reductive and uncritical approach by a leading anthropologist is a model for
the newest ‘empirical’ approaches of both the social sciences and the humanities.
As medical history has become a field within the new history of science that is more
and more engaged with local, real, and material world aspects of health and illness, inter-
est in representations has taken a back seat. In complex ways, we have returned to the
negative attitudes of the first generation of medical historians in the late nineteenth cen-
tury with regard to representations, as I documented in my book on Health and Illness:
Images of Difference (1995).
5 Indeed, the dividing line between the history of medicine
and the social study of medicine on the distinctions in the general field of the history of
science and science studies seems to be on this fault line between interpretation and
empiricism. Lorraine Daston recently commented on the distinctions in the general field
of the history of science and science studies, or to put it into the language of the acad-
emy: the distinction between the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ disciplines.
6 She quotes the
Harvard sociologist of technology ‘Sheila Jasanoff, speaking qua president of the Society
for the Social Studies of Science, [who] recently complained of a “somewhat one-sided
love affair” with the history of science and a certain “jitteriness about being caught out in
risque ´ company [that] marks the hiring practices of our major history of science
departments.”’ Social scientists interested in ‘science’ want the hard empiricism of his-
tory while, according to Daston, ‘the discipline of history... in turn was in hot pursuit
of cultural anthropology’.
7
Is ‘soft’ the new ‘hard’ for history? Hardly. For the history of science, and Daston’s
own work is a good example of this, has moved towards the technology of representation
and its material world history as central to this new, hard history of science. It is the
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296study of images that provides the core for a rethinking of the history of science. In
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s Objectivity (2007), the history of the image is at
the core. Using the history of the scientific image from anatomy to crystallography,
from the Enlightenment to the twentieth century, they sketch a world in which the crea-
tion of images is the reflection of the creation of a self-understanding of science within
the consciousness of the scientist. The scientist’s goal is as much in the ‘techniques of
shaping the self, as well as of picturing nature’.
8 Yet the claims of this critique of repre-
sentations still assumes some type of objective correlative, whether in the ‘real’ world or
in the psyche of the ‘scientist’. The critique of the former is clear: the absence of a theory
of mind – even a socially based theory of mind – places the ‘picturing of nature’ as a
reflex of the psyche of the scientist as a free-floating signifier.
‘Picturing’ is moved from being an individual act in an historical context, to that of the
collective self-labelled as ‘scientists’ without much consideration to the mechanisms pre-
sent. But present and universal they are. It is, as Peter Novick argued, decades ago, the
creation of an academic notion of objectivity out of the subjectivity of the historical
agent.
9 The scientific atlas thus is both the origin of and the creation of a scientific objec-
tivity that defines the scope of evidence for the historian of science.
While this new history of science with its bent towards a material world (read:
technological) orientation is as much of a construct, of course, as the biologisation of lit-
erary study through the application of evolutionary psychology or genetics, it is what is
perceived as fashionable in 2011. This pursuit, driven by what Marjorie Garber has
called ‘discipline envy’ has moved both fields in this direction.
10 Daston ends her
account with the same problem that Cooter and Stein recognised in the field of medical
representations; that the approaches of the history and the social study of science ‘are
contingent to a certain time and place yet valid for certain purposes’.
11 The history of
medicine has moved in this direction; new models have appeared; old objects have
been abandoned as they seem polluted by outmoded models of evidence and interpreta-
tion. The young Turks of the last generation have become the dons of this age; they must
be swept away and their questions abandoned. Daston imagines a solution:
[A] new vision of what science is and how it works has yet to be synthesised from the rich but scat-
tered and fragmented materials gathered by some twenty years of historicised history of science.
The very practices that made that history possible militate against such a synthesis coming from
the history of science itself. Science studies seem a still less likely candidate for the task. A new
form of interdisciplinarity must be forged. Philosophy, anyone?
12
Having just gone through the age of post-modern philosophical theory and the conco-
mitant abandonment of Popperian philosophy of science, philosophy seems a remote
possibility for the future of the history and culture of medicine.
In the same issue, Mario Biagioli noted that ‘the disciplinary predicament of science
studies offers a useful vantage point for reconsidering some of the recent debates on
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297the crisis of the humanities and the university.’
13 For him, the rupture is post-Kuhnian
with the easy – his claim – political critique of science as seen from the position of
post-modernism. At the conclusion of his essay, he presents a menu of what could be
done to improve the interface between science and the humanities in the near future.
He too, demands a rethinking of the function of the study of visual images in science
departing from the study of medical images. His sixth item reads:
6. Science, visuality, imaging techniques, and so on. Such analyses should not be limited to the
relationship between canonical art and canonical science (for example, Leonardo and anatomy)
but expanded to encompass the study of the widespread production and role of all sorts of imaging
techniques in science (both still and moving images). They could also venture in the direction of
science-based art, like bio-art and tissue art.
14
Is this the new aestheticism? Hard science now turned into the object of art galleries?
In a real sense this simply echoes the new materialism: as it replicates without question-
ing the image and its relationship to the very claims of science. Not surprisingly, any
critique of the division between the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ approaches to the interface
between the humanities and the ‘real’ history of medicine looks at the image as the
source for the study of the local, of the empirical, of technology and art; the cultural his-
tory of medical images, in this account, ‘merely’ studies representations with their global
meaning without much attention to the context or the history of the specific. This is
Cooter and Stein’s general point but is also echoed in Biagioli’s, as well as Daston’s –
and Galison’s – critique. Yet this debate, which is inherent to the question of a new
history of medicine, seems to be a recapitulation of what the study of images in the his-
tory and culture of medicine has been since the 1970s. Foucauldian globalism versus the
detailed study of the specific; the analysis of the epistemic vs the concern with the detail;
historical sociology or social study of science (whether Foucault or Latour) vs ‘real’
history. All centre on readings of representations as key to rather than illustrative of
Mitchell’s problems of visual hermeneutics. Yet the very questions of the categories
that Biagioli envisions are expanding the study of images points out the boundary ques-
tion even more clearly. Where does the history of medical images end and the employ-
ment of such images in the world of ‘art’ or at least in the world of the art gallery begin?
Must we not ask questions about the constitution, not of a rapprochement between ‘art’
and ‘science’, but the very selling of both? What does this employment of science in art
and art as science tell us about ‘discipline envy’ in the arts and the sciences? Can we see
a clear line between the furthering of such art by foundations such as the Wellcome Trust
and the sudden interest in the visual aspect of science as imported into the arts?
There is a need for a radical rethink of the function of the study of representations in
the history and culture of medicine. This does seem to demand our renewed attention
given its priority in recent discussions. But what position is open to us as critics of entire
systems of visual and cultural representation in terms of a new or renewed epistemic?
Where can we stand in terms of analysing the reflection or distortion of the meanings
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298associated with health and illness in the present world? The role of the study of medical
(in the broadest sense) representations, or perhaps better, images of health and illness and
their attendant social and cultural settings needs to be addressed while acknowledging
the new materialism and its claims about transcending its own cultural embeddedness.
The function of representations (and those trained to study and analyse them) in the his-
tory of medicine is to knit the function of public and private representations with the con-
tinuities and discontinuities in attitudes and beliefs both within and beyond the health
sciences. It is the frame for all empirical studies, as all such studies, whether epidemio-
logical, genetic, developmental, social, or cultural, rely to one degree or the other on the
analysis of representations. To study ‘medical technology’, without understanding how
its generation of representations is the key to its understanding, is limited, as those work-
ing on NMRI and genetics have shown; to study the representations without understand-
ing the technology and the knowledge it generates is equally one-sided. To then examine
the appropriateness of such images in the visual arts as a simple reflex of the interest in
medicine in the world is naı ¨ve beyond belief. Yet we must also understand the inherent
limitations of our own positionality. We engage with the world of medical representa-
tions not to show their duplicity or truth but to reveal their function in their historical
context; we too are subject to this rule. We need to find a means to examine such repre-
sentations by engaging with the debates about the meanings attached to representations
and narratives in any given context as a way of bridging these growing gaps in the
history and culture of medicine. By studying the claims about representations, you will
come much closer to their underlying epistemic value in any given system; and, of equal
importance, you can begin to understand the individual variants in or to these values. The
study of representations thus are a paramount means of examining both collective and
personal responses to cultural notions of health and illness, disease and healing, as
well as to institutions from the hospital to the advertising agencies engaged in these
worlds.
There are practical policy issues that are reflected in the problems that I have outlined
concerning the nature of representations of health and illness. These were important in
the 1980s but seem to have vanished in the most recent debates. Recently, I have written
about the continuities and ruptures in the image of the obese and obesity.
15 Yet such con-
siderations seem to play little role in the debates about healthcare in the United States
and the new healthcare bill [HR 4872]. Assuming that the bill remains basically the
same between now and 2015–16, when it comes into effect, one of the real questions
raised deals with whether the changes introduced will radically reduce costs and thus
enable more people to get better healthcare. The claim was – and this is classic Adam
Smith economics – the more people you have in a pool, the fewer, percentagewise, are
going to get ill at any given time, and therefore the general costs will go down. Meaning,
if you have healthy 18-year-olds in the pool, their contributions will help pay for older
people with greater health problems.
Yet it is the image of the ‘healthy 18-year-old’ and the ‘infirm elderly’ that shapes
such as argument. If the claims about increased obesity in children and teenagers are
15Sander L. Gilman, Obesity: The Biography
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Representing Health and Illness
299anywhere near accurate – I think they are more accurate than not – then we are going to
experience an enormous number of younger people who will have major illnesses early
on, as well as the sequelae from those illnesses. If you become diabetic when you are
forty, you will have cardiovascular problems when you are sixty. If you become diabetic
when you are ten, that means you are already going to be an ill 18-year-old and a sick
and very expensive 30-year-old.
The disjuncture between idealised images of ‘normal and healthy man / woman’ (an
odd version of what some economists call ‘rational man’ and the law has called
‘reasonable man’) that haunt such reckoning can be seen in today’s politics of obesity.
Childhood obesity has been taken up by Michelle Obama as one of her primary interests
as First Lady. Her view is that obesity is not a medical problem, even though it has
health consequences, rather it is a social or even a moral problem. Obesity is the result
of poverty or lack of desire to exercise and eat well. Such views stereotype all people
who are obese as poor or lazy and stupid and unable to deal with problems that they
themselves have some control over. But ever since, obesity has become a public health
issue that has an ever-growing pot of money associated with it. Everybody is jockeying
to get a part of that pie: the geneticists are making claims that it is all a question of
genetic inheritance; the endocrinologists are arguing that this is mainly a problem of
metabolic change; the infectious disease specialists point to increased obesity in those
infected with specific viruses; the people interested in social medicine say if people
only had better access to ‘organic or slow food’ there wouldn’t be any problem with
obesity – all of which, in bits and pieces, is true. The moralisers argue that we should
reintroduce physical labour – now in the form of compulsory exercise regimes in schools
or a ‘fat tax’ on unhealthy food. If the First Lady is heard, then obesity will not be
primarily a medical problem but a social one. Yet for some overweight people it is
primarily a medical problem. They are not going to be helped by having access to better
food and a better lifestyle. It is the image of the obese with all its history that frames
these questions. Without an awareness of this, the debates and the solutions will always
be partial, fragmentary, or contradictory. As an historian I am a great believer that what
medicine does best is to think about multiple causes for complex outcomes; and much of
what I’ve heard over the last couple of years, both in the medical science, sadly, and also
in the political realm is exactly the opposite. It is simple answers and simple proposals
based on incomplete command of the vocabulary of images employed. This is a typical
policy problem that the study of images of health and illness may help address.
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